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Writing: Three Politico-Economic Questions

Three Politico-Economic Questions: The Third Question

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THE THIRD QUESTION.

Whether the distribution of servants by drawing lots or some other unconditional method and a fixed wage for servants are compatible with our fundamental laws, morally equitable and useful to the country?

The liberty of a fortunate country in no way consists in the possession by one citizen or another of any special privileges, while others labour under some form of servitude; but when the lowliest subject in a society is able, under a good government, to pursue his own as well as the public good as freely as the most distinguished one, only then should it be termed liberty. And as such a common liberty of the citizens is the chief aim of our hallowed fundamental laws, everything that offends against it should be regarded as an infringement of the constitution itself.

Those who year after year require a large number of servants and daily face such great difficulties, both with regard to obtaining them – in part due to a significant population shortage, in part also due to such a treatment of servants that, whenever some other employment is available, they tend to avoid that master – and in regard to their payment, as wages have in 20 years risen to 2 or 3 times their former level, those people, I say, have latterly paid much attention to the removal of such great difficulties. To that end some proposals1 have also been put forward concerning the distribution of servants by means of a lottery, the decreeing of a fixed wage and other matters.

It is true that, if the proposal regarding the transfer of servants by means of a lottery or other unconditional method of distribution were to be adopted, every master could be quite sure of not being entirely deprived of servants as long as there were any for which to draw lots. It is also true that if the decree regarding a fixed wage for them could ever be enforced, it would be under such circumstances. But whether anything would be gained thereby generally and in the long run is a different question, or whether this plaster on such an old wound could give rise to a malignant cancer in the bowels of the state, of which one might not become aware until they have been largely destroyed.

The servants are indeed as much Swedish subjects as we their masters. Their service or labour is not to be regarded as anything other than commodities that they offer for sale to the benefit of themselves and the public; for it is precisely for that reason that the masters are able to increase their commodities. Among us every vendor enjoys the freedom to dispose of his commodities, if not to everyone then at least to a number of persons, whichsoever he prefers to do business with. He is also free to set a price on the commodity himself and to reach agreement on that with the purchaser, except in the case of certain tariffs that are changed either annually or monthly, although I do not wish to comment here on the extent to which they are observed or are truly beneficial to the country. But that a servant,

firstly, cannot himself retain his commodity but is,

secondly, obliged to sell it to someone selected by blind chance and also,

thirdly, at a price set by the purchaser himself – for, be it noted, the servants have no share in the legislative power – that, in a free nation, with good reason, I call servitude.

It would still be acceptable if this transaction were to be completed as quickly as a whole shipload of commodities can be sold, but to be obliged moreover to deal with one’s obligatory purchaser for a whole year is bound to make a person deeply unhappy, for which reason I also know many who have preferred to lose a whole year’s wages rather than submit to a hard and compulsory yoke.

The natural desire for liberty is certainly too great to be extinguished by such compulsion. It can be suppressed for a time, but it will express itself all the more powerfully and in a more unpleasant manner for the entire country than many might imagine.

Strict prohibitions have been issued against the emigration of people from the country, which could be made even stricter and a large number of inspectors be maintained at public expense to enforce them, and yet we would undoubtedly still have to put up with the vexation of seeing English and Dutch ships manned largely with Swedish-born crews. Should the compulsion be increased for Swedish subjects, they are likely all the sooner to make their way to freedom under a more permissive regime, especially as long as a broad highway lies open for that purpose through the Seamen’s Employment Exchange2 in Stockholm. To close that off with effective barriers must be one of the most pressing administrative tasks that the central government is considering.

If the Dutch and the English are bewildered when they see the eagerness of the Portuguese to promote crafts and commerce in their kingdom, I am sure that they will, on the contrary, smile somewhat wryly at such a servile system in Sweden.

No! We should not engage in such a self-destructive endeavour for the sake of a slight gain. Let us first, together with devotion to God, implant love for the fatherland in the hearts of our citizens. And as the majority believe that patria est ubi bene est,3 let us first promote their well-being, pleasure and lawful freedom, which is not based on indulgence in vices, and we will then all the more certainly achieve our aim. Let us go so far in that regard that we may, if possible, entice some of the runaways to return if we cannot persuade foreigners to move here. Let us encourage them to marry, allow them to live in cabins on our property and to receive a public subsidy for each child that they rear. Let us personally support one or more of their children to provide services to ourselves and others. When they serve us, let us employ love, patience and gentleness and not behave like tyrants.

The more necessary a commodity is and the less the supply of it, the higher its price will rise. But the dearer a commodity is in one locality, the greater the influx of that commodity there from other localities where they can do without it.

High wages for the servants are thus not entirely to blame, as they are in their own way an effective means of redressing the shortage of people in a country.

But it is also an urgent question whether the prohibitions serve the prosperity of society as a whole, by preventing the inhabitants of one province from redressing the shortage of people in another, even if, due to a lack of enterprise and earnings they prefer to spend their time in idleness rather than labour on some purported development project, for which there are still no incentives.

In a sound body the heart conveys most of the blood to the limbs where it is most needed, always ensuring that, whether the body contains too much or too little blood, all the limbs receive a proportional amount, and if that does not happen one limb will soon become powerless, when the whole body will be ailing. But if someone who has been entrusted with the welfare of the country could identify industries that will persuade the inhabitants of a country to remain there and ignore the opportunities elsewhere, he would not have to increase the penalty for runaways, could rescind the prohibition altogether and would still keep the people there. Otherwise he is likely to find that every effort toward that end will be in vain.

To establish a fixed price or annual wage for servants appears to me to be too unreasonable. For, in the first place, the workers differ considerably with regard to physical strength, inclination, skill, loyalty and virtue, just as commodities differ in value. For instance, two farmhands of the same age often differ so much in strength that when one is able to carry a load of 4 stone another will carry 12. If they are equally hard-working, it is clear that if one deserves a wage of 4 daler, the other is entitled to 12. But if the former is slow and the latter a fast worker, so that he always carries 2 loads for every one of the former, though neither could be said to be lazy, then if the former should receive 4 daler, the latter must receive 24. One man cuts ½ a cord of logs for firewood in a day, while I have seen another cut three. One is barely able to split fence poles and chop firewood all through the winter and scarcely earns more than his food, whereas another labourer works in a shipyard or on a building site and brings in 600 daler for his master. Should they then receive the same wage?

But if such a difference between workers should be split in half and a mean be established between the earnings of both to produce a certain wage for a farmhand, it is clear that one will receive too much and the other too little. That should in no way be regarded as a trivial matter, but as surely as setting an equal price for a good and a flawed commodity means that no one will take care to improve the commodity and anyone who has a commodity of good quality seeks out a merchant who will pay the full value of his commodity, just as surely such a fixed wage for servants means that no one will care about hard work and craft skills, and whoever has the inclination and enterprise will always be able to choose a different master in another locality who will pay him more for his labour, whereas utter wastrels will remain at home, to what irreparable harm to the community and the individual can easily be imagined. Such an arrangement appears to me like a coarse sieve that lets all the finest and best soil through and retains sticks and stones.

Nor should anyone believe that any prohibitions on the emigration of people would be able to prevent this. Experience convinces everyone that nothing is achieved by prohibitions in such sensitive matters when they conflict with the general preference, inclination or sense of fairness of a people. They are shackles that have to be continually watched. The surveillance is done by free guardians. Guardians at least occasionally slumber, and it will then be seen that those for whom the shackles were intended have thrown them off and in large numbers gained their freedom.

In the second place, the ratio of the value of the daler to labour and commodities differs too much between particular places and times, for in one locality I can obtain for one daler commodities that cannot be obtained in another for five. It would therefore be as preposterous to pay the same annual wage to servants in different places as to put a fixed price on the intrinsic value of the abovementioned commodities, their intrinsic value being endlessly variable.

In one and the same localities the same commodity varies no less at different times, partly due to the quantity and availability of the commodity, partly also due to the specific value of the daler, so that what was priced at one daler 20 years ago is now priced at two or more. How unreasonable would it not then be to oblige the servant, without regard to either of these factors, always to be content with the same amount of daler as an annual wage.

Against that I imagine that most masters will raise the objection that the freedom of the servants whether or not to serve, with whomsoever and for whatever wage they wish, would lead to an increase in annual pay, while one-year contracts would become rather rare and those who need many workers for their farming would be left short-handed, or at least the work, having to be undertaken with day-labourers, would become intolerably expensive.

But take note, dear master! The number of workers in the country would not be diminished by this freedom but would within a short time, by the promotion of marriages and the retention of those who are now obliged by an all too restricted freedom to move away, be considerably increased. They would be forced to support themselves by working, for there are no labourless occupations anywhere. Those who would then prefer year-long service will demand as much in annual pay as they think they can earn from daily wages but, considering the greater convenience of having board and lodging provided by someone else and of receiving a regular income, of which a day-labourer cannot be certain all the year round, they will ask for a good deal less, which is likely to be barely more than the current level of annual pay, when various items of clothing, together with hiring fees and other such things, are added to it. Those again who would rather earn a living by daily wages will, particularly at first, become the majority and likewise in future be far more numerous than now.

There are relatively few who, due to all kinds of accidental circumstances, are at present able to enjoy the proposed freedom and are thus in effect monopolists who, at times when their labour is in demand, can arbitrarily raise the price for their labour as high as they wish; but when they increase in number, their labour will inevitably fall to its inherent value in a free exchange, like any other commodity when it has escaped the grasp of the monopolists, and in proportion to the reduction in the daily wage the annual pay will inevitably also fall. If the daily wage should nonetheless rise somewhat during certain harvest periods, no one should have more reason to complain about that than about the rise in the prices of other commodities, for the consumption of labour is considerable and its utility manifold. For a master often finds it more profitable to use expensively hired workers during a harvest period than to maintain a large number of superfluous people the rest of the time, when the work is less profitable.

It is also vain to proclaim the drawing of lots as the most impartial method of distributing servants, as it subordinates both masters and servants to the same fortuitousness, as anyone will on the slightest reflection find that the freedom of both is lost thereby and only those benefit whom no one now wishes to serve because of their meanness. For as dissatisfied as a servant would be with a brutal master, as little would even a decent master be served if blind chance imposed on him a number of wastrels who consume his food, receive their wages and neglect his work.

These well-intentioned notions also provide everyone with the opportunity to examine to what extent the distribution of servants by means of a lottery or other compulsory method of distribution, as well as a certain wage, may be compatible with the liberty of an honest citizen and consequently with our solemnly ratified fundamental laws; whether it can in any way be regarded as morally reasonable; and whether the country can expect from it that advantage on which many might flatter themselves and others, blinded by a false self-interest, namely that of being as entitled as anyone else, irrespective of their treatment of the servants, to obtain them at quite a reasonable price.

From this one can also conclude on what basis the statute on servants should be placed if one also wants to have a good supply of servants in future and if they, as productive members of society, should not be regarded with contempt but, being the most valuable asset of the kingdom, be cared for most tenderly and be fairly provided with every conceivable relief and lawful freedom during their heavy and arduous labour for our convenience.

  1. some proposals: The notion preposed by Johan Kraftman of casting lots for servants gained support from many writers during the 1750s. Chydenius is possibly referring here to Kraftman’s Tankar om den wanmagt uti hwilken finska landtman sig befinner, in which he repeated his proposal. Kraftman’s publication appeared at the end of June 1761. As early as April of that year Efraim Otto Runeberg had issued his publication Nödige påminnelser wid tjenstehjons-stadgan.
  2. the Seamen’s Employment Exchange: Here Chydenius indicates two possible ways for Swedish subjects to leave the country. On the one hand they could take employment on foreign ships and earn their living in that way, or on the other hand they could take employment on any ship and then escape as soon as the ship called at a foreign port.
  3. patria est ubi bene est: Latin, “The fatherland is where it is good for one to dwell.” The expression is derived from a quotation by Cicero in Disputationes Tusculanae 5.37 from Pacuvius’ Teucer and has its counterpart in Aristophanes’ Plutos.

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